Forensic psychiatric autopsy: a challenge assessment by João Marques Teixeira
Citation: Marques-Teixeira J. Forensic Psychiatric Autopsy: A Challenge Assessment. Austin J Forensic Sci 
Criminol. 2017; 4(2): 1062.
Austin J Forensic Sci Criminol - Volume 4 Issue 2 - 2017
ISSN : 2380-0801 | www.austinpublishinggroup.com 
Marques-Teixeira. © All rights are reserved
Austin Journal of Forensic Science and 
Criminology
Open Access
Abstract
The forensic psychiatric autopsy, although it is a relatively rare forensic 
practice, has particularities that make it an exercise in clinical psychiatry not only 
extremely interesting, but also extremely specific among the several practices 
in the field of civil law. More often, unilateral acts by deceased elders are being 
challenged by relatives based on the argument that agents would not have the 
willingness capacity when they did the act.
It is the responsibility of the forensic psychiatrist to define, in a retrospective 
manner and without access to direct examination of the agent-only through the 
information contained in the records or through other means of information-3 
types of diagnoses of the agent in question at the time of the act: (1) nosological 
diagnosis; (2) a diagnosis of the degrees of freedom of being as a consequence 
of the former; (3) a diagnosis of the consequences on the willingness capacity 
from the previous two.
To illustrate this procedure, the author presents a summary of two reports 
of psychiatric autopsy, which were presented in court, ending with some 
considerations about this type of procedure.
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Introduction
One of the activities for which the forensic psychiatrist is often 
called to intervene in civil law is to attest to a person’s mental capacity 
at the time she caused an event that may be stipulated in civil law. 
The conceptual basis for this type of approach is based on the axiom 
that any forensic evaluation, including psychiatric evaluation, cannot 
be confused with a diagnosis because it represents a scientific report 
that provides the Justice System with a dynamic interpretation of a 
complex situation. In forensic psychiatry both psychiatric ability and 
mental fitness are based on the state of consciousness at the time of 
the act, but this state is not sufficient for the assessment of mental 
capacity as a whole. Therefore, in civil law, this capacity is defined 
as the mental capacity of a person to understand the content and 
especially the consequences of a unilateral (testament) or bilateral civil 
document (contracts, etc.). For this are considered either the state of 
normality or mental abnormality, or particular and understandable 
transitory states.
Most of the European states have laws that restrict a testator’s 
right to disinherit a presumptive heir. In addition, the courts are 
very willing to distribute assets to close relatives, so this legal bias 
favors presumptive heirs, who are usually the ones who most contest 
a will or a disposition. However, consistently with the policies of 
the European Union [1], the Portuguese State has determined that 
an innovative course should be drawn in the sense that the fact that 
a person suffers from an illness that limits her mental and physical 
faculties does not mean, nor must determine that she is, therefore, 
legally prevented from exercising all the rights he holds, but the extent 
of the disability must be fixed on a case-by-case basis, depending on 
the circumstances.
When the assessment of those circumstances is made 
retrospectively, upon the agent’s death, it is referred to as a psychiatric 
autopsy, in which the mental capacity is assessed retrospectively 
through the reconstruction of the agent’s mental state at the moment 
of the act.
A special situation of the psychiatric autopsy is the situation in 
which the annulment of a testament of a deceased agent is required. 
Most of these will contests are based on whether the testator himself 
lacked capacity or was under undue influence when executing the 
will. What is in issue is to demonstrate that the testator had the 
mental capacity to execute the will. This involves a full and accurate 
assessment of the clinical or other documents in the file so that a 
decision can be reached on the agent’s ability to decide at the time 
of the act under review. The psychiatric issues under discussion in 
these cases include the nosological classification, the symptoms that 
can be reconstructed from the documents available in the case, the 
reconstruction of the agent’s motivational system, and, finally, the 
association of all this, as underlying patterns of decision. For people 
with a pathology requiring a clinical evaluation by an expert, both the 
comprehensibility of the motivation and the absence of manipulation 
due to volitional deficit must be demonstrated.
The retrospective diagnosis of a particular clinical situation, when 
the patient has already died and therefore we have not means to collect 
a direct previous clinical history or a direct clinical examination, the 
retrospective diagnosis is only possible if we have enough documents 
to do so. Even if we can obtain a clinical diagnosis, in order to 
appreciate the influence of this diagnosis on the willingness capacity 
of the agent to want and understand the scope of a given act, we 
would have to have in those documents an appreciation of willingness 
capacity on the part of the clinicians that have seen the agent close to 
act and the reason is simple: the direct correlation between a clinical 
diagnosis and the willingness capacity, to want and to understand 
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the scope of a given act, simply does not exist or is very difficult to 
formulate, besides being variable between diagnoses and, within 
the same diagnosis, at different times. For example, in an earlier 
publication we refer to the following as regards schizophrenia (here, 
as an example only of the attribution of a diagnosis): “No one calls 
into question that an acute episode of schizophrenia or a condition 
typical of a schizophrenic defect imputability. This is mainly due to 
the fact that in these states the psychotic patient, at the moment of 
the act, is not able to assess the illicitness of the same or, even if she 
is, she is not be able to self-determine in function of that evaluation. 
But as the Bonn study and the subsequent investigations of nearly 
900 schizophrenic patients have shown that there are frequent 
uncharacteristic basic states in which patients experience the basic 
symptoms as deficiencies, being able to adapt and compensate them, 
preserving the capacity of insight and reality testing. This means that 
the capacity to work and social life may be altered, while maintaining 
the responsibility and the civil capacity” [2]. That is, it is not the 
fact of having a diagnosis of schizophrenia that in itself makes its 
bearer a person with deficits in the ability to judge and, in this sense, 
to maintain the civil capacity and this is taken intuitively: mental 
and civil capacity is underpinned by considerations of autonomy, 
broadly conceived. It is beyond the scope of this article to offer 
a discussion on the many facets of autonomy and its relation with 
forensic psychiatric assessment [3-5]. The point to emphasize is that 
it was based on the relationships between autonomy and forensic 
psychiatric assessment that this clinical approach was developed with 
the intention of providing the court with the clinical-scientific bases 
of the relationship between mental illness and mental capacity, where 
the court decisions could be rooted.
To illustrate this approach we present two cases of psychiatric 
autopsy of our clinic, were the demand was to analyze if the deceived 
agent was having his willingness capacity preserved at the moment of 
making his unilateral document. These two cases were based only on 
the clinical material present in the forensic file, and were triggered by 
the family that contested de civil document.
Case Presentation
Case 1
This is a male that died in October 2010, suffering from an 
oncological disease. From the clinical observation reported in the 
clinical file at 4/17/2008 (where, in addition to the references to 
oncological disease in progress, it is mentioned, with interest for this 
assessment, that the patient had no “pathological personal antecedents 
worthy of registration” or family members with psychiatric disorders), 
until the subsequent consultations referred to here to 7-1-10, there 
was never mentioned in the records of changes of a psychic nature, 
but rather of the physical symptoms resulting from the oncological 
treatments applied; even the prescription of antidepressants is part 
of the legis artis in these cases, in which it is recommended to take 
antidepressants to treat some depressive symptoms reactive to the 
oncological situation, understanding that the improvement of mood 
improves the acceptance of oncological, invasive and uncomfortable 
treatments.
On 04-29-10, his doctor reported the clinical evolution of the 
patient regarding his oncological condition, from 04-17-08 to 04-21-
10, and at no time having referred to any change in the psychic state of 
the patient. This can even be verified by clinical records in the period 
between the dates mentioned above, by frequent references to “well-
being” or “well-disposed patient”. On 06-01-10 he is hospitalized due 
to febrile condition after a chemotherapy cycle, having been improved 
on 06-09-10. In the course of hospitalization, there are numerous 
references in the nursing records to the mental state of the patient 
who, after a short period of mental confusion (at the beginning of the 
hospital stay), quickly recovers and becomes “aware and oriented” 
until discharge.
On 06-22-10, he went to the hospital for an acute abdominal 
condition and was treated and improved on 06-23-10, without 
reference to any change in his psychic state.
On 06-30-10, the patient is observed by his usual doctor who 
declares that the patient “maintains his intellectual faculties”.
At 07-30-10 he signs informed consent for cataract surgery, with 
a similar signature to the one used in informed consent dated of 05-
02-08 and 02-04-10.
On 08-18-10, about 1.5 months after the testament, the patient 
is again observed on Onco-Hematology, presented a good general 
condition, translated into an adequate weight (62 kg), and a general 
physical examination without changes registered, being to registered 
the fact that the clinician had to register in the clinical process the 
place where it was living (“Already living at your own house!”), 
indicating a marked improvement in its general condition.
The patient dies on 10-08-10.
Analysis of historiographical-clinical data: The patient in 
question suffered from cancer disease for which he underwent 
specific treatments started in 2008. Throughout the treatments the 
patient suffered from the usual side effects in this type of treatment 
(loss of strength, loss of appetite, nausea and vomiting, and reactive 
depression both to disease and to treatments). But he always recovers, 
to the point that he has returned to his usual residence.
Even in more troubled periods of side effects or parasitic 
infections, the patient always recovers from more confusional 
states of consciousness associated with weakened general state and 
hydroelectrolytic imbalance.
Throughout this period of long treatments there has never been 
any reference to any psychiatric condition that could interfere, on an 
ongoing basis, with the state of consciousness not even the depression 
associated with the oncologic picture had any interference in the state 
of consciousness.
The patient makes the testament on 06-06-10, and the next day 
his regular physician observes him and declares that he keeps his 
intellectual abilities preserved about 1 month after the will, the patient 
is subject to cataract surgery, having signed an informed consent, the 
signature of which is similar to the one made in previous informed 
consent and, a month and a half after the will he is again observed by 
his usual doctor and his normal mental state is confirmed.
From this analysis we can conclude the following: based on the 
clinical records in the file, and except for a short period of 1 day 
during hospitalization for febrile complications after chemotherapy 
and with rapid recovery, no alteration of consciousness or confusional 
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state of the patient has ever been reported, despite the severity of the 
disease and the severity of the treatments. There is also little reference 
to psychiatric treatments for severe disturbance of consciousness or 
confusional state with behavioral changes.
The patient makes a will and, on the following day, was evaluated 
by his habitual doctor who declares the maintenance of his intellectual 
capacities. In addition, he resumed his habitual residence and 
underwent cataract surgery, having also signed an informed consent 
that presupposes a capacity for understanding and judgment about 
the medical act to which he was to be subjected, as well as the ability 
to decide on the subject, as well as to be aware of the risks involved.
That is, in psychiatric terms and based on clinical records; 
we have no indicators that tell us that the patient did not have the 
psychological conditions to exercise his willingness capacity. On the 
contrary, the clinical records go in the opposite direction.
So, in the field of forensic psychiatry, the questions that arise here 
are: Is it possible to deduce the ability to judge, retrospectively, on the 
basis of clinical records alone? If so, what are the main indicators that 
should be valued in this analysis? And what are the main constraints?
Regarding the first question, it is obvious that even with a post-
facto observation of the mental state of an individual by direct 
examination; it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that at the 
time of the act the ability to judge was fully preserved. Much less 
by the analysis of clinical records without direct examination. That 
is, we are always talking about judgments of presumption based on 
an important fact of human life: its historical-vital continuity. That 
is, by removing exceptional situations, our psychic life presents a 
continuity of meaning that allows an experienced observer to deduce 
whether or not there was a break in that continuity of meaning at the 
moment of fact. But these judgments of presumption are probabilistic 
judgments that can be covered with a high or low probability of being 
in accordance with reality. The degree of probability will depend on 
the analysis of previous and post-facto events, events of medical-
psychiatric nature, with behavioral translation, that allow to deduce if 
the continuity referred to above was broken or not. This presupposes, 
first of all, the type of clinical picture under study, its complications 
and, very importantly, its impact on the psychic life regarding 
interference with the willingness capacity. It is in this analysis that the 
opinion delivered here is based.
Concerning the second question, the important factors to be taken 
into account have to do with the clinical observation of the general 
and psychological state of the patient throughout the treatments, as 
well as the intercurrence of medical or psychiatric events that may 
directly interfere in the ability to judge. The third question is directly 
related to the fact that if there are no indicators that allow us to make 
that assessment, it is not possible to obtain elements to deduce a 
psychiatric-forensic judgment. However, we must bear in mind that 
the absence of some indicators may be a factor to value, as we will see 
ahead.
Having said that, let us return to the present case and analyze it 
against the background described above.
a) What can we say about the historical-vital continuity in relation 
to the case being evaluated and the act in question: the will? The data 
from the records indicate, with a high degree of probability, that this 
continuity of meaning was not lost, since the patient had, 6 days 
before the will, a clinical evaluation of discharge from the hospital 
that indicated that the patient was well fitted in the psychic domain, 
because otherwise there should be any reference to the change in 
his psychic state and his referral to psychiatry. Likewise, on the day 
following the will, the patient is observed by his habitual doctor who 
declares, precisely, the permanence of this psychic state. That is, with 
a high degree of probability, the patient maintained its historical-life 
continuity before, during and after the testamentary act. However, it is 
important to know whether there is a high probability of a rupture of 
the historical-vital continuity, if this continuity was compatible with 
the ability to judge. That is, if there is no change in the way he lives, 
if, even then, the patient would be able to make an aware decision 
concerning the testamentary act and its consequences? Not suffering 
from a psychiatric condition known from clinical records, with the 
exception of reactive depression which, on its own, hardly changes 
that ability, only if his physical illness had metastases to the brain 
and as a consequence could change in a way more or less durable, 
the ability to judge. However, at no point in the clinical history did 
this situation arise, nor was there a need to resort to any diagnostic 
auxiliary examination to mislead this possibility. Of course we are 
talking about doctors with high experience in oncology, in which this 
possibility occurs in many neoplastic diseases.
b) What, then, are the main indicators that allow us, with a high 
probability, to suggest that the patient was capable of an aware decision 
at the time of the will? First of all, by the presence, affirmatively, 
of several clinical records continued in time, of the patient being 
conscious, oriented and, generally, with a mental state suited to his 
circumstances. But also by the lack of referral to psychiatry for clinical 
observation for a state that could alter the patient’s consciousness 
and behavior, as well as the absence of requests for diagnostic tests 
to assess the state of functioning of the brain, as discussed above. In 
addition, a return to normal life, as reported in the clinical records, is 
an indicator of balance that deserves consideration.
Conclusion: There are no records in the file that allow us to 
state objectively that at the time of the will the patient suffered from 
changes in the capacity to judge, to want and to understand the scope 
of his act.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that 
at the time of the will the probability of the patient having the capacity 
for judgment to want and to understand the scope of his act would 
have been vastly superior of not being able to want and to understand 
the scope of the act.
Case 2
This is a male that died in June 2013 by a heart attack. In 
November 2004, the patient was considered as having no structural 
pathology of the brain (assessed by computerized axial tomography 
and validated by a neurologist), nor presented mental deterioration 
(assessed by Mini Mental State Examination-MMSE-and validated by 
a neuropsychologist), having had a short hospitalization period with 
the diagnosis of “undiagnosed disease”), according to a document 
signed by the Clinical Director of the Psychiatric Hospital where he 
was as inpatient. Although, a later document is presented where one 
of the physician of the hospital report that the patient suffers from 
paranoid delirious syndrome. It is also reported that the patient will 
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have had a myocardial infarction 30 years earlier.
Between 2004 and 2008 there were no clinical records, and for 
the first time the reference to the dementia syndrome appeared in 
a registry of 09-10-08, by his habitual psychiatrist. One year later 
(May 5, 2009) the same doctor notes that there was a worsening of 
memory, in January 2010, the same doctor report that the patient 
is compensated, in March of the same year that is depressed and in 
September of the same year that is stable. Between September 2010 
and March 2011 there are no records of consultations (deducting 
that the examinee will not have made medical consultations), and 
on March 10, 2011, the patient have made a will and on June 29, 
2011 there was again reference to dementia. On October 10, 2012, a 
reference to the lack of autonomy in daily life activities is reported for 
the first time. In summary, this is the sequence of events which are 
relevant to the present case.
Analysis of historiographical-clinical data: Let us examine some 
details of these events. In 2004 (7 years prior of making the will) the 
patient was clinically evaluated (by a psychiatrist and a neurologist) 
and performs ancillary diagnostic tests (CAT scan and MMSE) and is 
considered not suffering from structural changes of the brain.
Between 2004-2008 there are no clinical records. In September 
2008, a dementia syndrome register appeared without any reference 
to the degree, type and data that supported the diagnosis. That is, 
we do not know if the clinician only evaluated the patient by clinical 
interview method, if she applied or had him apply a set of obligatory 
neuropsychological tests, according to legis artis, to support a 
diagnosis of dementia syndrome. In the absence of reference to 
such in the file, we do not know the degree and the type of dementia 
syndrome, and if it exists at all.
The same happens 1 year later when the same doctor reported that 
there was a worsening of memory without specifying the degree of 
worsening and the type of memory that was aggravated was evaluated 
(if clinically, if instrumentally).
For about one year later, the same clinician reported that the 
patient was “compensated”, a few months later “he was stable” and 
then “he was depressed”, without specifying what she means by to be 
“compensated”, “stable” or depressed: would compensated be equal 
to normal behavior, or normal functioning, or normal memory? And 
stable, would it be equal to normal mental functioning? And would 
depression be the same as having a diagnosis of depression or just 
having an increased sadness?
This is followed by a new period in which the patient has no 
medical records (between September 2010 and June 2011) during 
which the patient makes a will.
In June 2011 there is again reference to dementia, without 
specification or clarification and in October 2012 (more than 1 year 
later) there is a reference to the lack of autonomy in activities of daily 
living.
From this analysis we can conclude the following:
In 2004, the patient did not present structural brain disease 
(evaluated by clinical, imaging and neuropsychological examination). 
Between 2004-2008 there was an apparently healthy period.
In 2008, a dementia syndrome was reported, the value of which, in 
our view, is null and void, because good medical practice has not been 
complied with for a diagnosis of this kind and because “apparently” 
the patient has recovered from it. A hypothetical dementia syndrome 
was alleged 2 years after, although the patient remained about 1 year 
without clinical records.
It is during this period that the patient makes a will. That is, in the 
period after the doctor said to have improved and stabilized, despite 
the finding “depressed.”
From the former, what can be safely stated is that the patient 
underwent long periods without medical consultation and that, even 
if he had any neurodegenerative pathology, it would be unstable in 
nature, recovering and worsening from time to time.
That is, in psychiatric terms, we have no way of saying that the 
person examined was completely healthy from the point of view of 
neurodegeneration (that is, that he did not have a dementia), as we 
have no means to say otherwise.
As stated in the introduction to this paper, it is not enough for 
someone to present a particular diagnosis (in this case, a diagnosis of 
dementia) in order to immediately deduce that this diagnosis would 
have implications for the ability to judge.
Even though we have seen that there are no means in the record 
to establish with certainty that at the time of the will, the person 
examined would have a diagnosis of dementia, let us do an academic 
exercise and consider that yes, he suffered from dementia at the time 
of the will.
What are the consequences of this putative diagnosis for the 
ability to judge and to want and to understand the scope of his acts, 
namely the will that he did?
If it were an Alzheimer’s, Lewi-Bodies, or Frontotemporal 
disease, the consequences would be very dependent on the degree 
of dementia: grade 1 or mild (no attainment of the ability to judge); 
Grade 2 or moderate (partial attainment of the ability to judge); 
Grade 3 or severe (attainment of the ability to judge). That is, if we 
had a diagnosis of each of these types of dementia safely, we would 
have to determine the degree to consider a hypothetical alteration 
of the ability to judge that, even then, would have to be assessed by 
administering specific neuropsychological tests to determine (usually, 
when made according to the legis artis, they present a reliability rate in 
the order of 85%). Furthermore, any one of these types of dementias 
evolves inexorably into a worsening which, though variable from 
patient to patient, extends in the cognitive plane within 3-4 years.
On the contrary, if the patient had a putative diagnosis of a 
vascular dementia, which is caused by several small cerebral infarcts 
and usually installed in patients with cardiac pathology, characterized 
by the patients presenting in the early stages a better discernment 
than the patients with Alzheimer’s type dementia, together with 
a relatively preserved personality for a longer period of time than 
the Alzheimer’s type dementia. Symptoms may include periods of 
depression and mood swings, and the condition progresses with 
worsening (during small strokes) and periods of recovery and 
stabilization (after those small strokes). Usually people with this type 
of dementia die from cardiorespiratory arrest or stroke. In this type 
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of dementia, the same question arises as to the relationship between 
dementia degrees and the ability to judge, as well as to instrumental 
measures for accurate assessment of the degree of attainment of the 
ability to judge, although it is possible to admit periods of stability 
and even improvement.
If a diagnosis could be made with the data we have, it would be 
vascular dementia and never Alzheimer’s dementia. The reasons, 
albeit in terms of probability, but based on the medical events 
reported in the file, are as follows: (1) the patient presented periods of 
stabilization and compensation (although what the clinician meant 
by this designation is not known, (2) presented some periods of 
depression, which are also typical of vascular dementia; (3) dies, on 12 
June 2013, for cardio-respiratory arrest, which is frequent in vascular 
dementia.
Conclusion: A- There are no reports in the records that allow us 
to affirm objectively that at the time of the will the patient suffered 
from changes in the capacity to judge, to want and to understand the 
scope of his act, or the opposite.
B- There is a suspicion that the patient is developing a dementia 
that, due to the evidence in the file, namely the fluctuations of 
his mental state, not only for the long periods without medical 
appointments, but also for the references, although vague, to periods 
of stability and compensation, as well as the cause of death, would 
most likely be a process of a vascular nature.
C- To have a neurodegenerative pathology - which could only be of 
the vascular type, for the reasons already mentioned - the probability 
of the patient being in a period of stability during the will would be 
very large for 3 order of reasons: (a) the nature of the insane process 
that has progressed throughout phases of worsening and recovery; (b) 
corroborated by the fact that the patient between September 2010 and 
June 2011 did not have any type of clinical record, it can be deduced 
that he did not need to be consulted, and that in the last pre-testament 
register (September 2010) the clinician reported that the patient was 
stable; (c) the fact that the patient suffers from cardiac pathology and 
died from cardio-respiratory arrest.
D - In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that at the 
time of the will, the probability of the patient having the capacity for 
judgment to want and to understand the scope of his act would be 
far superior to not being able to want and to understand the reach 
of the act.
Conclusion
One of the important aspects in this type of forensic psychiatric 
assessment is the analysis of the clinical course of the patient through 
clinical records or other information elements (such as family, 
friends, etc.) in order to establish three types of diagnosis: (1) the 
nosological diagnosis; (2) the diagnosis of the degrees of freedom and 
(3) the diagnosis of the causal relations between the mental state and 
the respective abilities of wanting within the time in which the act 
was made.
What the expert is therefore asked, in an assessment of this kind, 
is a statement on the presence or absence of a psychiatric disorder 
together with its severity, as well as a decision on the effects of that 
disorder on the possibilities of acting (or degrees of freedom) of the 
agent in question. When we refer to possibilities of acting we are 
referring to the possibilities of being able to decide in this or that way 
within the time in which the act was made. In fact, it is only with 
these three aspects that one can approximate the probability that, at 
the moment of the act, the patient would or would not be able to 
judge and evaluate the consequences of that act. Taken together, these 
considerations suggest that the assessment of the mental capacity 
involves a balanced judgment between the presence or absence of 
mental disorder, between the context of the will and the personality of 
the patient, even though the presence or absence of mental disorder 
predominates in this judgment.
In these two cases, the diagnostic discussion was fundamental for 
the elaboration of the 2nd diagnosis - that of the degrees of freedom 
- in order to inform the court about the probability of the patient 
having the conditions of will and wanting need to validate the act in 
legal terms.
It is obvious that the necessary condition for the elaboration of 
the reports on forensic psychiatric autopsies is the existence of clinical 
records, without which these autopsies would not have been possible 
or, at most, would have led to spurious conclusions. Even so, as was 
emphasized in clinical cases, the diagnostic judgments were, at each 
one of the levels, elaborated in probabilistic form.
It is always up to the Court to supplement the data of a forensic 
psychiatric autopsy with other data (particularly witnesses) in order 
to prepare its decisions.
References
1. European Community Regulation (2012). EU Regulation nº 650/2012
2. Marques-Teixeira J. Inimputabilidade e esquizofrenia na legislação 
portuguesa Inimputability and Schizophrenia in Portuguese Legislation. 
Saude Mental. 2008;   5: 7-11.
3. Radoilska L. Autonomy and mental disorder.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; 2012.
4. Diário da República nº 165/2015, Série 1 de 2015-08-25.
5. Stoljar N. Theories of autonomy. In  Ashcroft, A. Dawson, H. Draper, JR. 
McMillan. Principles of health care ethics 2nd ed. Chichester:  John Wiley & 
Sons Ltd;  2006. 11-17.
Citation: Marques-Teixeira J. Forensic Psychiatric Autopsy: A Challenge Assessment. Austin J Forensic Sci 
Criminol. 2017; 4(2): 1062.
Austin J Forensic Sci Criminol - Volume 4 Issue 2 - 2017
ISSN : 2380-0801 | www.austinpublishinggroup.com 
Marques-Teixeira. © All rights are reserved
